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Abstract
To understand how interpersonal agreements can be generated within complexly diﬀeren-
tiated social systems, we developan agent-based comp utational model of negotiation in which
social inﬂuence plays a key role in the attainment of social and cognitive integration. The
model reﬂects a view of social inﬂuence that is predicated on the interactions among such
factors as the agents cognition, their abilities to initiate and maintain social behaviour, as well
as the structural patterns of social relations in which inﬂuence unfolds. Findings from a set of
computer simulations of the model show that the degree to which agents are inﬂuenced
depends on the network of relations in which they are located, on the order in which interac-
tions occur, and on the type of information that these interactions convey. We also ﬁnd that a
fundamental role in explaining inﬂuence is played by how inclined the agents are to be concil-
iatory with each other, how accurate their beliefs are, and how self-conﬁdent they are in deal-
ing with their social interactions. Moreover, the model provides insights into the trade-oﬀs
typically involved in the exercise of social inﬂuence.
 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Social inﬂuence has long been an object of popular fascination and scientiﬁc re-
search in such ﬁelds as social psychology [55,80] structural and network analysis
[30,37,45], sociology [19,21,31] administrative science [75], organisation theory
[7,16,59], and distributed artiﬁcial intelligence [41,83]. Across all these disciplines, in-
ﬂuence researchers are concerned with the same challenging puzzles. How can one
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convince an acquaintance that what they believe is correct is in fact wrong, and what
they used to consider wrong is right? When and how do people become more ﬂexible
and change their beliefs and goals, and when do they become more committed and
stick to their attitudes? When do we want people to agree with us, and how do we go
about reaching an agreement?
These are all issues of social inﬂuence. What they have in common is the problem
of how socially and cognitively diﬀerentiated individuals can become socially and
cognitively integrated. As pointed out by Friedkin [30], this represents an old socio-
logical problem that is rooted in Durkheims insight that social diﬀerentiation does
not necessarily lead to discordant actions and attitudes. There are forms of social dif-
ferentiation that entail an integrative social structure in which interpersonal agree-
ment can be generated [25]. However, elucidating mechanisms by which people in
diﬀerent positions come to be coordinated still remains a key theoretical problem
that has long been studied in research areas such as persuasion and attitude change
[10], power and authority relations [52], group polarisation [58], social conformity
[55], minority inﬂuence [57] and the generation of social norms [72].
A ﬁrst line of enquiry has been concerned with the structural conditions that fos-
ter and impede the development of interpersonal agreements. On the one hand, some
theorists have been primarily interested in the social control implications of social
structure and institutionalised arrangements within organisations and social institu-
tions [16,75]. Institutionalised status characteristics and power structures have been
regarded by these theorists as the main sources of social integration. In this view, so-
cial structure inﬂuences the individual actors in two main ways [75]. Firstly, it per-
mits stable expectations to be generated by each actor as to the behaviour and
mental states of the other actors. Secondly, it provides the general stimuli and atten-
tion-directors that shape the actors attitudes, habits, states of mind and, ultimately,
behaviour. Along these lines, the main function of social structure is to set the con-
ditions for the development of coordinated activity and interpersonal agreement. On
the other hand, other theorists have argued that even strongly constraining social
structures do not subsume the whole individual, and actors who occupy identical so-
cial positions might exhibit substantially diﬀerent behaviour and attitudes [48,49,85].
Personal goals, beliefs, and values introduce highly idiosyncratic and diverse re-
sponses to the circumstances of identical social positions. In this case, when extrane-
ous conditions seepinto the determination of the behaviour and mental states of
actors in social positions, the generation of interpersonal agreements and coordi-
nated activity cannot be regarded simply as mechanistically determined by institu-
tional arrangements.
The emphasis on the individuals and their idiosyncratic attitudes underscores the
importance of a second line of inquiry concerned with the role that cognitive and
behavioural micromechanisms play in the attainment of social integration in com-
plexly diﬀerentiated social structures. In order to address this issue, theorists have
variously emphasised either social interaction procedures or cognitive processes that
have a bearing on the generation of coordinated activity and interpersonal agree-
ments. Some researchers, like for instance symbolic interactionists, have been
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various types of agreements such as shared understandings, deﬁnitions of the situa-
tions, and interpersonal ‘‘contracts’’ [46,77]. Related lines of inquiry in social
psychology developed theoretical models of social inﬂuence that describe the emer-
gence of collective opinions in natural settings by focussing on the underlying net-
work of social interactions [22,29,42]. Finally, other theorists have concentrated
on individual decision rules, problem-solving procedures and local rationality mech-
anisms [66,70]. In an eﬀort to investigate the aggregate properties of an organisation
or a social system generated by repeated interactions among the actors involved, as-
sumptions have been developed about the cognitive processes and strategies by
which decisions are made by the individual actor [39]. Along these lines, a great body
of research has concentrated on the emergence of coordinated activity and agree-
ments from a set of individual motives, values, preferences, objectives, decision strat-
egies and micromechanisms of social behaviour [2,3,67].
All the foregoing research avenues provide an analysis of the direct impact that
structural, social or cognitive factors have on the generation of interpersonal agree-
ments. However, with only few exceptions [30], most of these studies rarely look at
the eﬀect that combinations of diﬀerent factors have on the ﬁnal agreement. As a re-
sult, the problem of elucidating mechanisms of social inﬂuence that are based on a
fully explicated model of the interconnections among social structure, cognition
and social interaction, remains relatively unexplored. This article presents one pos-
sible approach to this very general problem by postulating a model of negotiation
and agreement generation that is rooted in the interactionist approach, but, nonethe-
less, will take into account both the contextual features of the set of social relations
in which the inﬂuence process unfolds, as well as the actors cognitive structures and
their social abilities to initiate and maintain social interactions with one another.
To this end, included in the model are the following components of the inﬂuence
process: (i) the actors mental states; (ii) principles for social interaction; and (iii)
structural patterns of social relations. An actors mental state is the set of the basic
mental attitudes that are processed to undertake both theoretical and practical rea-
soning [61,62]. Principles for social interaction refer to the procedures that actors use
to initiate and maintain social processes with others (e.g. rules for determining when
to start and when to exit a social relationship; rules for communication). Structural
patterns of social relations reﬂect the social context in which an actor operates and
are concerned with the articulation of the structural conditions in which social pro-
cesses are generated (e.g. who interacts with whom; how social relationships involv-
ing more than two actors are organised; in what order actors are involved in social
relationships, and whether they are involved simultaneously or sequentially). Our in-
terests lie in the main and combined eﬀects of these factors on social inﬂuence, here
regarded as the process through which an actor, located in a social context and ca-
pable of cognitive and social processes, aﬀects, and thereby alters, the mental states
of other actors. Thus, the model reﬂects a conception of social inﬂuence as a socio-
cognitive process whose typical outcome is the adoption of socially motivated mental
attitudes and, ultimately, when played out in a network of social relations, the gen-
eration of interpersonal agreements among diﬀerent actors.
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which we vary systematically the key components of the model. Results allow us
to explore the dynamic implications of social inﬂuence over time, and provide us
with new insights into the attainability of higher-level mentalistic phenomena in
complexly diﬀerentiated communities [30,34]. In particular, we run a set of virtual
experiments to investigate the role of social inﬂuence in the negotiation process un-
derpinning the sale of a privately held company through the public oﬀering of shares
and, possibly, through the involvement of an active investor. We use this domain in
our study because of its suitability to a formal modelling approach. Building on
mainstream literature in behavioural ﬁnance [47,60], we developa model of negoti-
ation by deriving its main assumptions from extant theory and established empirical
studies of going public processes. Using this model, we examine to what extent the
performance of the sale of a ﬁrm is aﬀected by the actors negotiation protocols
and cognitive structures as well as by the selling strategies which, in turn, reﬂect
structural patterns of social relationships in which social inﬂuence unfolds. By ex-
ploring the relative eﬀects of these factors on the performance of negotiation, an at-
tempt is made here to determine, on theoretic grounds, the role that social inﬂuence
processes play in the attainability of higher-order mentalistic phenomena such as in-
terpersonal agreements.
In the following section, the process of going public is presented by describing its
articulation, the various economic actors involved, the range of possible strategies
that can be used for selling a ﬁrm, and the debate that exists in the literature as
to the relative beneﬁts of these strategies. This is followed by a detailed description
of the model of negotiation and its main components. The model will then be used
to run a series of simulations, for which we will provide a description of the exper-
imental design and a discussion of the results. Simulations will be organised into two
groups. The ﬁrst group is intended to examine the individual and combined eﬀect
that structural patterns of social inﬂuence and the economic actors negotiation be-
haviour have on the performance of the sale. In the second group, we look at the
role of actors cognition more closely, and we explore the individual and combined
eﬀect that structural patterns of social inﬂuence and the actors cognitive accuracy
have upon the performance of the process. Finally, we summarise and discuss our
major ﬁndings, evaluate the models scope and provide some avenues for future
work.
2. Framework description
The domain in which we will analyse the issues raised above is the sale of a pri-
vately held company through a number of alternative selling strategies, each reﬂect-
ing a diﬀerent structural pattern of social inﬂuence that the seller can exercise upon
the potential investors [63]. We envisage examining whether and to what extent the
choice of a selling strategy, in combination with other social and cognitive factors,
impacts upon the negotiating agents mental states and, ultimately, upon the gener-
ation of an agreement and the performance of the going public process.
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owners lastingly impacts upon the ﬁrms ownershipstructure and, therefore, the
ﬁrms value will be inﬂuenced. A great deal of literature and recent empirical evi-
dence suggests that to maximise the revenue raised from the shares sold in the public
oﬀering, it is fundamental to choose the appropriate design for the sale which, in
turn, reﬂects the ﬁnal ownershipstructure [4,33,47,51,74]. On the one hand, the p ub-
lic oﬀering of shares may mainly involve relatively small investors who will just re-
main passive holders of the ﬁrms shares. On the other, there might be investors
who are interested in a large block of shares and are willing to ultimately play an
active role in the ﬁrms management. These active investors are individuals or organ-
isations that, by purchasing a controlling interest, will eventually act either as mon-
itors of the ﬁrms current management or as proponents of new directions in the
ﬁrms long-term strategies and decisions via changes in the management team or sim-
ply by bringing expertise or other resources to the ﬁrm.
Active investors seeking controlling blocks can be put into competition with
small, passive investors seeking the same shares in dispersed allotments. This can
be done, for example, by initially selling a portion of the shares to passive investors
and then later putting a controlling block up for sale on terms determined in part by
the price of the outstanding shares [47]. This highlights the importance of treating
the issuance of shares as a process incorporating transactions over time, instead of
a single event independent of the ﬁrms plans for subsequent ﬁnancing as has often
been the case [8,40,50,73]. The results of earlier sales may aﬀect the terms of later
sales, and the terms of earlier sales may be determined in part by the expected ben-
eﬁcial impact on ownership structure and the terms of later sales [47]. Accordingly,
what types of investors are involved in negotiation, in what order they are inﬂuenced
and using which method represent fundamental decisions that are likely to impact
upon the ﬁnal outcome of the sale.
These observations are supported by a great deal of recent empirical evidence
about the segmentation of the market for shares [5,8,33,35,60,71]. This literature
shows that ﬁrms manage the sale of shares with the purpose of discriminating be-
tween relatively small and passive investors and applicants for large blocks [8]. This
engenders the belief that going public is not an isolated step, but a complex and ex-
tended process with distinct and heterogeneous markets for dispersed shareholdings
and potentially inﬂuential blocks.
Even though this view of the sale of a ﬁrm seems to be conﬁrmed in the literature,
nonetheless debates exist over the relative beneﬁts of diﬀerent selling strategies in-
volving diﬀerent actors in a diﬀerent order. Some theorists argue that selling the con-
trolling block ﬁrst avoids the free rider problem [32] and can also help reduce the
winners curse problem faced by small investors [69]. Along these lines, it has been
suggested that by selling shares using a mixed oﬀer in which a tender oﬀer is made
ﬁrst to the large investor and the tender price is then used to set the ﬁxed price in
the oﬀer for sale to small investors, the seller might extract surplus from small inves-
tors [76]. By contrast, other researchers claim that by selling the controlling block
ﬁrst, the active investors allocation cannot be made contingent on the parameter
of aggregate demand by the small investors, and therefore the seller cannot extract
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amount of non-controlling shares ﬁrst allows the seller to obtain information about
the market for dispersed shares on which the price of the controlling block can be
made contingent. Barry et al. [5], for example, report that control turnover subse-
quent to the initial public oﬀering (IPO) represents the most frequently used method
for sales in which venture capital ﬁrms are involved. In this case, during the ﬁrst
transaction, the equity holdings of venture capital investors do not change much; la-
ter on, these investors sell a signiﬁcant portion of their stakes, either to another ac-
tive investor or to another company or through a follow-on oﬀering. Along these
lines, control turnover subsequent to the IPO has been found by Holderness and
Sheehan [35] for the US, Rydqvist and H€ o ogholm [71] for Sweden and the UK,
and Pagano et al. [60] for Italy. Furthermore, it has been suggested that this strategy
has been adopted in many equity carve-outs [40,73].
In addition to these studies that explored selling strategies in which diﬀerent inves-
tors are approached by the seller sequentially in a diﬀerent order, other studies have
focused on strategies in which all the investors interact with the seller simultaneously.
There are researchers who suggest evidence of a simultaneous sale of shares to small
investors with a discriminatory allocation of a potentially controlling block. For in-
stance, Brennan and Franks [8] refer to a method that combines a private placement,
targeting large investors, with a simultaneous public oﬀering. It has also been argued
that, whenever used, this selling strategy usually includes a clawback provision [47].
This makes the allocation to a large investor dependent on the demand by small in-
vestors, therefore creating competition among investors of diﬀerent types. Finally,
other strategies have been reported in which the seller interacts only with the small
investors. An example of this selling strategy is the oﬀer for sale by tender, employed
in the UK and in France, where investors place bids for the shares indicating both
quantity and price [47]. After the bids have been received, a single share price is es-
tablished and all investors buy shares at that price. Accordingly, with this strategy
the seller is unable to discriminate among the small investors, and all shares are of-
fered at a uniform price. However, there is an interesting variant of this strategy, in
which the seller is allowed to adopt discriminatory practices and allocation rules: the
sealed-bid discriminatory auction. This is a sale in which the investors tender bids
and those bidding the highest buy shares at the price bid. There are a number of ways
in which discrimination can be accomplished in an IPO. For example, empirical ev-
idence suggests that in the US the allocation of oversubscribed issues is a means for
discriminating among buyers [33]. Evidence of discrimination in connection with an
IPO has been found also in the UK market [8].
The foregoing studies indicate that there is debate in the literature as to the rela-
tive impact of the design of a sale on performance. Therefore, pulling all the avail-
able ﬁndings into a single coherent model represents a diﬃcult task. There are two
main limitations to these studies. First, their results are based on a series of empirical
and case studies that rarely look at the same or comparable variables. As a result, it
is often diﬃcult to directly compare and interrelate their ﬁndings. Second, these stud-
ies rarely describe the process underlying the relationship among variables. Hence,
the problems of analysing the appropriate variables that are likely to aﬀect perfor-
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remain relatively unexplored. More speciﬁcally, some of the key questions that need
to be addressed are: How and to what extent should the heterogeneity among poten-
tial investors aﬀect the ﬁrms strategy for selling shares? How should a ﬁrm approach
and inﬂuence potential investors in order to maximise its expected revenues? Should
the marketing of dispersed shareholdings and that of potentially controlling blocks
occur separately in selling a ﬁrm? In particular, does it matter that the sale disperses
the shares through an IPO before negotiating with an investor who is interested in
buying a controlling block? Or is it better ﬁrstly to pass on a block to someone
who wants a controlling stake, and then organise a subsequent IPO? This paper pre-
sents one possible approach to these problems by proposing an agent-based compu-
tational model of negotiation and agreement generation in connection with the
process of going public. Using this model, we will address the above questions by
undertaking a comprehensive and systematic process-based analysis of the relative
impact that diﬀerent ways of exercising social inﬂuence have on the performance
of the sale of the ﬁrm.
3. Basic model
In this section we describe our model of negotiation and agreement generation, its
fundamental assumptions, components and properties (see Panzarasa et al. [63] for a
more technical description). The model draws on and extends the tradition of
behavioural models in the ﬁnance literature associated with work by Bebchuk and
Zingales [6], Kahan [38], and Mello and Parsons [47]. It focuses on the negotiation
process between the seller of the ﬁrm and potential investors. The seller may be either
the owner of the ﬁrm or the representative of a company that owns the ﬁrm. The
main assumption on which the model is premised is that potential investors are
not homogeneous in their ability to monitor the newly public ﬁrms management
[47,76]. We identify two classes of investors. First, there is a population of small
and passive shareholders with virtually no monitoring capabilities. Second, there
are large and active investors who seek a controlling block in order to actively shape
or control the ﬁrms management. For simplicity, small and active investors are as-
sumed to be risk neutral [47]. Therefore, they only diﬀer in their demands for the
shares of the ﬁrm and, consequently, in the degree of inﬂuence they are expected
to exert on the ﬁrm once they become shareholders. For simplicity, we assume that
the seller is unable to discriminate among the small investors, and accordingly the
model components will be couched in terms of only one small investor who is as-
sumed to represent the whole population. Similarly, interactions with only one po-
tential active investor will be examined, and therefore the model will not address
such issues as how a number of potentially interested active investors should be
put into competition with one another, and how the seller should choose a potential
active investor to negotiate with.
Both the seller and the investors are conceptualised as cognitive agents endowed
with mental attitudes representing the world and motivating action [61,62,84].
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but it also represents the other agents as cognitive agents similarly endowed with
mental attitudes for representational and motivational purposes [23]. The cognitive
characterisation of the agents mental states and decision-making apparatus is here
formalised building on a fairly standard belief–desire–intention (BDI) framework
[17,68,84]. Accordingly, each agents mental state is seen as a set of interrelated men-
tal attitudes comprising beliefs, goals and intentions. First, beliefs correspond to the
information each agent has about its environment. Beliefs are incomplete and may
be updated as new pieces of information become available. Second, goals represent
the top-level agenda or the set of states of aﬀairs the agent wants to bring about. Fi-
nally, intentions refer to those states of aﬀairs that the agent commits itself to bring
about in order to achieve (some of) its goals [68,84]. Furthermore, the model draws
on the BDI framework for describing each agents decision-making process in terms
of transitions between mental attitudes. Upon receiving new information, beliefs will
be updated and intentions generated that do not contradict the agents beliefs. Inten-
tions, in turn, will have to match against top-level goals, which may also be subject
to modiﬁcations as a result of information-gathering processes.
Finally, both the seller and the investors will be modelled as autonomous, reac-
tive, proactive, and socially capable agents [28,36,84]. First, they have control over
their own tasks and resources and will take part in cooperative activities only if they
choose to do so (autonomy). Second, each agent is assumed to respond to any per-
ceived change that takes place within its environment and that aﬀects its mental state
(reactiveness). Third, agents do not simply act in response to their environment, but
they exhibit opportunistic behaviour, take the initiative where appropriate, exploit
and create serendipity (proactiveness). Fourth, agents can initiate social relationships
and therefore engage in a wide variety of social interactions with others in a ﬂexible
manner (social ability).
Drawing on these assumptions, in what follows we will present a description of
the model. For ease of communication, the model will be organised into four funda-
mental components: the agents mental state speciﬁcations (Section 3.1); the evalua-
tion parameters used by the agents to assess the messages received (Section 3.2); the
negotiation protocol (Section 3.3); and a set of selling strategies for going public
(Section 3.4).
3.1. The agents’ mental states
Even though the structures of both the investors and the sellers mental states are
assumed to be organised into the same mental attitudes (beliefs, goals and inten-
tions), nonetheless each type of agent diﬀers in terms of the instantiation of the men-
tal attitudes.
Small investors have beliefs about the value of the ﬁrm. We assume that, for each
small investor, is, the value of a share in the ﬁrm can be modelled as the sum of two
components. One component is related to the ‘‘book value’’, BV, of the ﬁrm. BV re-
ﬂects the turnover and assets of the ﬁrm calculated under a common metric, and is
information in the public domain about which there is no uncertainty. Added to this
424 P. Panzarasa, N.R. Jennings / Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory 10 (2002) 417–453common component is an idiosyncratic component, ICs, that is private information
to the small investor and that, together with BV, determines the actual price the
small investor is prepared to pay for a share in the ﬁrm. ICs may reﬂect, for example,
the small investors tax status or liquidity preference, which, in turn, might aﬀect the
small investors valuation of the ﬁrms expected cash ﬂows [47]. The small investors
beliefs are therefore assumed to reﬂect both BV and ICs. Based on these beliefs, the
small investors generate the goal to maximise their expected utility by purchasing
shares of the ﬁrm at the lowest possible price. Finally, in order to have their goal ful-
ﬁlled, the small investors maintain the intention to negotiate with the seller and,
more speciﬁcally, to receive an oﬀer from the seller and to evaluate it.
As with the small investors, the active investors beliefs reﬂect his evaluation of the
ﬁrm. The active investor, ia, seeks a controlling block in order to actively inﬂuence or
monitor future managements decisions. He might be interested in acquiring control
for instance because of information he has about a strategy that would allow him to
use the assets of the ﬁrm and increase the value of the ﬁrms cash ﬂows. As with the
small investors, the actual price that the active investor is prepared to pay for a share
in the ﬁrm will vary from the book value by an idiosyncratic component, ICa.I n
turn, ICa can be split into two components: a ‘‘discount’’, Dis, and a ‘‘premium’’,
Pre. On the one hand, the reason for a discount is that the active investor, upon
achieving control of the ﬁrm, is expected to be in a position to implement changes
in future managements decisions that may increase the value of the ﬁrms expected
cash ﬂows. Since all shareholders will beneﬁt from these changes, the seller can dis-
criminate in favour of the active investor by oﬀering the controlling block at a dis-
count (based upon the public beneﬁts of control) from the price paid by small
investors [47]. On the other hand, as long as the active investor can use the control-
ling block to extract private beneﬁts, the seller can raise the price at which a control-
ling block is oﬀered and, as a result, the active investor will pay a premium over the
price paid by small investors who do not obtain the private beneﬁts of control.
Whether the ﬁnal price at which the controlling block is oﬀered reﬂects a (net) dis-
count or premium depends upon the relative signiﬁcance of the public and private
beneﬁts associated with the controlling block. Given this, the active investors beliefs
are assumed to reﬂect both the book value, BV, and the idiosyncratic components
Dis and Pre. Furthermore, the active investor generates the goal to maximise his ex-
pected utility by purchasing a controlling fraction m of the shares at the lowest pos-
sible price. Finally, as with the small investors, in order to have his goal fulﬁlled, the
active investor will intend to receive an oﬀer from the seller and to evaluate it.
On to the sellers mental state. There may be a number of reasons that could ex-
plain the decision of selling a ﬁrm, including liquidity preferences, the realisation of
gains from selling to better-positioned parties, exploiting favourable market condi-
tions, gains from focus, and so forth [76,86]. In this paper, we will take the decision
to put the ﬁrm on the market as given and concentrate on the issues surrounding the
implementation of the sale. We assume that the seller of the ﬁrm, s, does not have
complete information about the state of the market for dispersed shares. Nor does
he have complete information about the attitude of potential active investors toward
his ﬁrm. This implies that the seller can only take a guess at the small investors
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should be oﬀered to an active investor, as well as at the premium an active investor
should pay for the privilege of being involved in the ﬁrm. The sellers incomplete in-
formation about both the small and active investors will be operationalised by as-
suming that the seller takes the small investors idiosyncratic component and the
active investors control premium and discount to be random variables with normal
density probability distribution. The sellers beliefs are therefore assumed to reﬂect:
the book value of the ﬁrm, BV; the mean and standard deviation of the active inves-
tors control premium, lPre and rPre respectively; the mean and standard deviation of
the active investors control discount, lDis and rDis respectively; the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the small investors idiosyncratic component, lICs and rICs respec-
tively. Furthermore, the sellers goal is assumed to be to release the maximum
amount of revenue from the sale of the ﬁrm. Finally, in order to have his goal ful-
ﬁlled, the seller maintains the intention to receive and evaluate the messages for-
warded by the investors.
3.2. Evaluation parameters
During negotiation, all the agents will typically receive, evaluate, generate, and
send messages. The execution of such activities is based on a set of rules for inter-
agent social behaviour. These rules consist of the following two main components:
(i) a set of evaluation parameters; and (ii) a protocol for generating messages. In this
section, we will concentrate on the evaluation parameters, whereas in Section 3.3 our
focus will be on the negotiation protocol.
In order to establish a share price with the seller, the small investors evaluate pro-
posals and counter-proposals based on a range of acceptable prices. For each small
investor, this range is limited by the maximum value per share that he is willing to
pay, MaxPis, and the minimum price, MinPis, that represents the ﬁrst counter-oﬀer
that he will make to the seller upon receiving an unacceptable oﬀer. These two values
represent the small investors evaluation parameters used during negotiation. We as-
sume that MaxPis is given by the sum of the book value of the ﬁrm and the small
investors idiosyncratic component, that is: MaxPis ¼ BV þ ICs. On the other hand,
MinPis is assumed to reﬂect the information that is publicly available and about
which there is no uncertainty, i.e., the ﬁrms book value: MinPis ¼ BV.
As with the small investor, the active investors behaviour is guided by a price
range limited by a maximum value that he is willing to pay, MaxPia, and a minimum
price that represents his ﬁrst counter-oﬀer to the seller, MinPia. We assume that
MaxPia depends on the book value of the ﬁrm and the diﬀerence between the active
investors control premium and discount, that is: MaxPia ¼ BV þ Pre   Dis. On the
other hand, MinPia will simply reﬂect the ﬁrms book value, that is: MinPia ¼ BV.
Let us now turn to the sellers price range. Both the maximum value (i.e. the max-
imum price that the seller can reasonably ask) and the minimum value (i.e. the lowest
price he will be willing to accept) depend upon whether the seller negotiates with the
active or the small investors. Furthermore, both types of investors (small and active)
can be put into competition with each other by approaching one type with an oﬀer
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the price range used by the seller to negotiate with one type of investors will also re-
ﬂect whether or not negotiation with the other type has already taken place.
When the seller negotiates with the active investor and shares have already been
sold to the small investors, the maximum and minimum limits of the sellers price
range, MaxPs=ia and MinPs=ia, are determined as follows. MaxPs=ia is assumed to de-
pend on the book value of the ﬁrm as well as on a subjective component, MaxICa,
reﬂecting the sellers belief about what the maximum value of the active investors
idiosyncratic component might be. Further, the impact of MaxICa on MaxPs=ia will
depend on the ratio between the price established with the small investors, Ps=is, and
the book value of the ﬁrm. Thus, as the market price increases (decreases) with re-
spect to the book value, the seller will increase (decrease) the maximum price that
he may be willing to ask for a controlling block:
MaxPs=ia ¼ BV þð MaxICaðPs=is=BVÞÞ
We assume that MaxICa depends on the sellers beliefs concerning the probability
distributions of the active investors control premium and discount. More speciﬁ-
cally, MaxICa will reﬂect the sellers guess at the means and standard deviations of
both distributions:
MaxICa ¼ð lPre þ brPreÞ ð lDis   brDisÞ
where b is a constant factor that expresses the sensitivity of the sellers evaluation
parameters to changes in the degree of accuracy of his cognitive representations.
The minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell shares to the active inves-
tor, MinPs=ia, depends on the book value of the ﬁrm as well as on a subjective com-
ponent, MinICa, reﬂecting the sellers belief about what the minimum value of the
active investors idiosyncratic component might be. Again, the impact of MinICa
on MinPs=ia is assumed to depend on the ratio between the market price at which
shares have already been sold to the small investors, Ps=is, and the book value of
the ﬁrm. As with MaxICa, we assume that MinICa reﬂects the sellers guess at the
means and standard deviations of the active investors control premium and discount
as well as a constant sensitivity factor b. Finally, we assume that in no circumstances
will the seller accept a price that is lower than the book value of the ﬁrm. Thus, we
have:
MinPs=ia ¼ BV þð MinICaðPs=is=BVÞÞ if ½BV þð MinICaðPs=is=BVÞÞ  > BV
BV otherwise
 
where MinICa ¼ð lPre   brPreÞ ð lDis þ brDisÞ.
When no negotiation has already taken place with the small investors, the sellers
price range is determined as follows. The maximum price he may happen to ask will
be: MaxP 
s=ia ¼ BV þ MaxICa, where MaxICa is deﬁned as above. On the other
hand, the minimum acceptable price will be: MinP 
s=ia ¼ BV þ MinICa, where
MinICa is deﬁned as above.
When the seller negotiates with the small investors, his price range is determined
as follows. We assume that, when a controlling block has already been sold, the
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holdings for sale on terms that are contingent on the share price paid by the active
investor [47]. In this case, the maximum price the seller may happen to ask, MaxPs=is,
depends on the book value of the ﬁrm as well as on a subjective component, MaxICs,
reﬂecting the sellers belief about what the maximum value of the small investors id-
iosyncratic component might be. The impact of MaxICs on MaxPs=is will depend on
the ratio between the price at which shares have already been sold to the active in-
vestor, Ps=ia, and the book value of the ﬁrm. Thus, as the price paid by the active in-
vestor increases (decreases) with respect to the book value, the seller will increase
(decrease) the maximum price that he may be willing to ask for dispersed sharehold-
ings:
MaxPs=is ¼ BV þð MaxICsðPs=ia=BVÞÞ
where MaxICs ¼ð lICs þ brICsÞ.
Similarly, the minimum price the seller is willing to accept from the small inves-
tors, MinPs=is, is given by:
MinPs=is ¼
BV þð MinICsðPs=ia=BVÞÞ if ½BV þð MinICsðPs=ia=BVÞÞ  > BV
BV otherwise
 
where MinICs ¼ð lICs   brICsÞ.
Finally, when no negotiation has already taken place with the active investor, the
sellers maximum and minimum prices used during negotiation with the small inves-
tors will be respectively:
MaxP
 
s=is ¼ BV þ MaxICs and MinP
 
s=is ¼ BV þ MinICs
where MaxICs and MinICs are deﬁned as above.
3.3. Negotiation protocol
Based on their beliefs, the agents will attempt to achieve their (top-level) goals by
fulﬁlling their own intentions. In turn, fulﬁlment of intentions generates social inter-
action. The negotiation protocol refers to the social interaction mechanisms that,
once instantiated with the evaluation parameters, are used by the agents to evaluate
incoming messages and forward new ones. The protocol builds on the following
main assumptions: (i) each agent will remember what message has been sent and
who it has been forwarded to; (ii) investors do not negotiate with each other, but
only with the seller; (iii) negotiation begins with the seller asking an investor (either
small or active) the maximum value of his price range; and (iv) the ﬁrst counter-oﬀer
the investor (either active or small) makes to the seller is the minimum acceptable
value of his price range.
After a message with an oﬀer has been sent, agents will typically wait for a re-
sponse. Upon receiving an oﬀer, each agent will evaluate it. An oﬀer can be either
accepted or modiﬁed and sent back. Ideally, negotiation can continue until an agree-
ment is reached. However, in most cases it is not reasonable to assume that negoti-
ation will continue forever. Although persistent in keeping their joint commitment to
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messages, they will give upnegotiation [18,62]. Given this, we can distinguish be-
tween three diﬀerent responses that the agents may give after receiving a message:
(i) acceptance; (ii) modiﬁcation; and (iii) rejection.
We assume that a message is accepted in the following two situations: (i) the sell-
ers oﬀer to the small investors, ps=is, or to the active investor, ps=ia, is lower than, re-
spectively, MaxPis or MaxPia;
1 and (ii) the counter-oﬀer forwarded to the seller by
the small investors, pis=s, or by the active investor, pia=s, is greater than the correspon-
dent minimum price the seller is willing to accept.
Messages that are not accepted are usually modiﬁed and returned to the other
party. However, under our assumption of limited persistence, unacceptable messages
can not only be modiﬁed, but also rejected. The agent who rejects a message will gen-
erate the intention to exit negotiation. In this case, negotiation fails and no ﬁnal
agreement is reached. We assume that a message will be rejected if: (i) it is not accept-
able; and (ii) the number of messages (oﬀers and counter-oﬀers) that have already
been exchanged among the agents is greater than an integer value n .
However, when the number of messages exchanged is less than n , the agents will
keepnegotiating and will modify the unaccep table oﬀers received. Modiﬁcations are
made according to a price movement strategy. Each price movement strategy depends
on the interplay between the oﬀer sent originally and the counter-oﬀered received.
Firstly, should the seller receive at time t0 an unacceptable oﬀer from the small or ac-
tive investor, pt0
is=s or pt0
ia=s respectively, he will modify this oﬀer and send back at time t
ðt > t0Þ a new counter-oﬀer, pt
s=is or pt
s=ia. Speciﬁcally,
p
t
s=is ¼
pt00
s=is   cðpt00
s=is   pt0
is=sÞ if ½pt00
s=is   cðpt00
s=is   pt0
is=sÞ  > MinP 
s=is ðor MinPs=isÞ
MinP 
s=is ðor MinPs=isÞ otherwise
(
and
p
t
s=ia ¼
pt00
s=ia   cðpt00
s=ia   pt0
ia=sÞ if ½pt00
s=ia   cðpt00
s=ia   Pt0
ia=sÞ  > MinP 
s=ia ðor MinPs=iaÞ
MinP 
s=ia ðor MinPs=iaÞ otherwise
(
where pt00
s=is and pt00
s=ia are the oﬀers sent at time t00 ðt00 < t0 < tÞ by the seller to the small
and active investor respectively, and c ð06c61Þ is a concession rate reﬂecting the
sellers price movement strategy. Thus, if the modiﬁcation turns out to be lower than
the minimum price that the seller is willing to accept, then the seller will oﬀer back
his minimum price. Otherwise, he will send back the modiﬁcation.
Secondly, should the small or active investor receive at time t0 an unacceptable of-
fer from the seller, pt0
s=is or pt0
s=ia respectively, he will modify the oﬀer received in the
following way:
p
t
is=s ¼ pt00
is=s   cðpt00
is=s   pt0
s=isÞ if ½pt00
is=s   cðpt00
is=s   pt0
s=isÞ  < MaxPis
MaxPis otherwise
 
1 This is a strong assumption as it would be reasonable for the agent to keep negotiating even when an
‘‘acceptable’’ price has been oﬀered and keep trying to obtain a lower one. For the sake of simplicity, we
have not attempted to represent this aspect in our model.
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p
t
ia=s ¼ pt00
ia=s   cðpt00
ia=s   pt0
s=iaÞ if ½pt00
ia=s   cðpt00
ia=s   pt0
s=iaÞ  < MaxPia
MaxPia otherwise
 
where pt00
is=s and pt00
ia=s are the oﬀers sent at time t00 ðt00 < t0 < tÞ to the seller by the small
and active investor respectively, and c is a concession rate reﬂecting the investors
price movement strategy. Similarly, if the modiﬁcation is greater than the maxi-
mum price that the investor is willing to accept, then he will counter-oﬀer his
maximum price. Otherwise, he will send back the modiﬁcation.
3.4. Selling strategies for going public
Building on mainstream literature on staged equity ﬁnancing and behavioural ﬁ-
nance (see Section 2), we assume that the sale of the ﬁrm can be organised according
to one of the following selling strategies for going public that have been most used in
countries with developed markets [4,8,47,53]:
(i) va sequential sale in which the controlling block is sold before the IPO (strategy
A);
(ii) ia sequential sale in which the IPO takes place before the sale of the controlling
block (strategy B);
(iii) a single-period parallel sale in which shares are oﬀered both to small investors
and to the active investor at the same time (strategy C);
(iv) a public oﬀering in which all shares are sold to small investors at a uniform
price, without involving an active investor (strategy D).
In our second set of simulations (Section 5.2), our main goal will be to gain a
better understanding of how information and the agents cognition interact to
impact on the performance of social inﬂuence.
To this end, we will introduce the following variant of strategy B, in which more
information is used to negotiate with the active investor:
(v) a sequential sale in which the IPO is followed by an informationally enriched
sale of a controlling block (strategy B*).
In what follows, we will brieﬂy describe each of the above ﬁve strategies.
(i) Strategy A. The seller interacts with two types of potential investors: the active
investor and the small investors. The ﬁrst task is to establish a price for the sale of
shares to the active investor. To this end, the seller will negotiate with the active in-
vestor by letting him have an oﬀer with a proposed price without any further infor-
mation. If this stage is successful, both the seller and the active investor will update
their mental states by generating the belief that a share price has been established
and the intention to sell/buy shares at that price. However, negotiation with the ac-
tive investor may well be unsuccessful and no price may be agreed upon. In such a
case, no transaction will take place between the two parties. After negotiating with
the active investor, the seller then proceeds to establish a share price with the small
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them know whether or not a controlling block has been sold at an earlier stage. Fur-
thermore, through his evaluation parameters (Section 3.2), the seller will be in a po-
sition to make the price oﬀered to the small investors contingent on prior negotiation
with the active investor. If the seller is successful in negotiating with the small inves-
tors, then a price will be agreed upon, and both the seller and the small investors will
update their mental states. As a result, a transaction will occur. Otherwise, should
negotiation fail, no ownershiptransfer would take p lace.
(ii) Strategy B. The seller interacts with both the small investors and the active in-
vestor. The ﬁrst task is to establish a price for the sale of shares to the small inves-
tors. To this end, the seller will typically negotiate with the small investors by
forwarding them a price with no additional information. If this stage is successful,
both the seller and the small investors will update their mental states by generating
the belief that a market price has been established and the intention to sell/buy shares
at that price. A transaction will then take place and, as a result, a non-controlling
fraction of the ﬁrm will be transferred from the seller to the new owners. Otherwise,
should negotiation be unsuccessful, no ownershiptransfer will occur. The seller then
proceeds to establish a share price with the active investor by oﬀering him a price and
letting him know whether or not an IPO has occurred. Again, selling a controlling
block is made contingent on previous economic transactions since the sellers evalu-
ation parameters for negotiation with the active investor depend on whether or not
prior negotiation with the small investors has already taken place. If negotiation with
the active investor turns out to be successful and a price for a controlling allotment is
agreed upon, both the seller and active investor will update their mental states. A
transaction will then take place. Conversely, should negotiation be unsuccessful,
no transfer of control will occur.
(iii) Strategy C. The seller interacts simultaneously with the active investor and
the small investors. Thus, two prices need to be established for the sale of shares
to both types of investors. To this end, the seller negotiates and tries to inﬂuence
the investors by approaching them simultaneously, sending them an oﬀer, and letting
them know of the ongoing parallel negotiation for both a controlling block and dis-
persed shareholdings. If negotiation is successful, each agent will update its mental
state by generating the belief that a price has been agreed upon. We assume that
the active investor gets control only with a bid that is higher than the bid of the small
investors competing for the shares [47]. Speciﬁcally, if the price established with the
active investor is greater than the market price for dispersed shareholdings, then the
seller proceeds to sell the controlling block, whereas the remaining allotment of
shares will be sold to the small investors. Conversely, if the price for dispersed shares
is greater than the price for the controlling block, then the seller will sell all shares to
the small investors.
(iv) Strategy D. With this strategy the seller interacts only with the small investors.
Negotiation is therefore aimed at establishing only a market price for dispersed share-
holdings. The seller will typically negotiate with the small investors by letting them
have an oﬀer with a proposed price and no further information. If successful, nego-
tiation will eventually lead the seller and the small investors to update their mental
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dispersed shares is established, all shares are sold at that price to the small investors.
(v) Strategy B*. This is a variant of strategy B, in which the seller tries to more
convincingly exert social inﬂuence upon the active investor by providing him with
more detailed information on which the price being oﬀered is made contingent. More
speciﬁcally, the seller will approach the active investor with an oﬀer comprising not
only a price for the controlling block but also the market price established with the
small investors. We assume that, once the active investor has updated his mental
state with the market price for dispersed shareholdings, he will also modify his eval-
uation parameters in the following way. If Ps=is is the market price for dispersed
shareholdings communicated by the seller, the active investor will set his mini-
mum acceptable price MinPia at Ps=is rather than at the book value BV. On the other
hand, the maximum price, MaxPia, will be set at Ps=is þ Pre   Dis instead of BVþ
Pre   Dis. Since the market price will never be lower than the book value of the ﬁrm
(Section 3.2), these modiﬁcations imply that both the minimum counter-oﬀer the
active investor will make and the maximum price he will be willing to accept from
the seller will increase.
In what follows, we are not concerned with issues related to the sellers freedom
and ability to choose what selling strategy to use. Nor are we interested in exploring
the extent to which the market determines what strategy is actually adopted. Our in-
terest in the above ﬁve selling strategies simply lies in their potential for oﬀering a
straightforward way to manipulate the structural components of social inﬂuence. In
fact, they provide the structural patterns of social relations in which social inﬂuence
can be exercised and agreements achieved among actors in diﬀerent social positions.
Moreover, each selling strategy, by reﬂecting a distinct pattern of social relations and
interactions, is associated with a distinct communication network. In this respect, dif-
ferent strategies reveal diﬀerent communication patterns in which actors are con-
nected through diﬀerent pieces of information, of diﬀerent quality, and forwarded
in diﬀerent temporal orders. Building directly on the proposed taxonomy of strategies,
we are therefore in a position to elucidate the systematic implications of the social
structure in terms of the exercise of social inﬂuence and the generation of agreements.
4. Virtual experiments: design and methodology
The model introduced in the previous section will now be used to undertake a se-
ries of virtual experiments. Our aim is to examine the individual and combined ef-
fects of social structure, cognition and social interaction on social inﬂuence and
the generation of interpersonal agreements. We organise our simulations into two
sets. In the ﬁrst set, we use a 4   6 design where inﬂuence structural patterns and so-
cial interaction are manipulated. On the one hand, inﬂuence patterns are manipu-
lated using selling strategies A, B, C and D. On the other hand, social interaction
is operationalised through the negotiation protocol and its correspondent concession
rate c ð06c61Þ that agents use to instantiate their price movement strategy for
modifying the unacceptable oﬀers received during negotiation (Section 3.3). To allow
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following six values for c: 7.5; 10; 12.5; 15; 17.5; and 20.
In the second set of simulations, we use a 5   6 design where inﬂuence structural
patterns and cognition are manipulated. Here, we extend the range of possible inﬂu-
ence patterns by including strategy B* into the set of alternative selling strategies that
can be used. This will enable us to get a deeper insight into the role that information
plays in negotiation. More speciﬁcally, we will investigate whether, when strategy B*
is adopted, the active investor becomes more motivated to accept the oﬀer received
than would be the case if the seller had forwarded only a price without any further
information that might justify it. Thus, a comparative analysis of strategies B and
B* will lead to an evaluation of the extent to which sharing additional information
makes the exercise of social inﬂuence more eﬀective and eﬃcient. The second indepen-
dent variable––the agents cognitive accuracy––will be manipulated through the qual-
ity of the sellers beliefs about the active and small investors demands for the shares of
the ﬁrm. In turn, the quality of the sellers beliefs is measured by the value the seller
assigns to the standard deviation of the active investors control premium and control
discount, rPre and rDis respectively, and of the small investors idiosyncratic compo-
nent, rICs (Section 3.2). The higher the standard deviation, the less accurate the sellers
beliefs. The standard deviation will be either 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, or 0.5. These values
allow us to cover varying degrees of the sellers cognitive accuracy, from perfectly ac-
curate beliefs ðr ¼ 0Þ through to progressively more inaccurate beliefs.
In both sets of simulations, the dependent variable––inﬂuence performance––is
operationalised through the performance of the sale of the ﬁrm, which in turn is
rated by two measures expressing, respectively, the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of
the sale: (i) the revenue raised; and (ii) the length of time the agents take to get to
an agreement. A particular way of exercising social inﬂuence, deﬁned in terms of a
combination of an inﬂuence structural pattern with a protocol or with a degree of
cognitive accuracy, turns out to be more eﬀective than alternative ways if it allows
the seller to raise higher revenue. Conversely, inﬂuence becomes more eﬃcient if it
is associated with a lower amount of time it takes the agents to reach an agreement.
The revenue raised in the aggregate sell of shares is calculated by multiplying the
number of shares sold by the price per share that has been agreed upon by the agents.
The length of time it takes the agents to make an agreement is measured by the num-
ber of messages that the agents must send to each other before they can reach a ﬁnal
agreement.
Negotiation is generated using the UM-PRS architecture
2 (see Lee et al. [43]
for details), which, in turn, we extended and enriched by adding the computational
2 The University of Michigan Procedural Reasoning System (UM-PRS) is a high-level agent
architecture in which: (i) the agents are represented using notions of mental states; (ii) the agents actions
are a function of these mental states; (iii) the agents mental states may change over time; and (iv) mental
state changes are formalised in terms of axioms and inference rules. UM-PRS allows the user to deﬁne and
control the agents mental states. In addition, the user can test diﬀerent patterns of interagent social
behaviour and argumentation in the negotiation process.
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to examine systematically the interactions among, and the eﬀects of, a variety of struc-
tural, social and cognitive factors on negotiation performance that have long
concerned researchers. Nevertheless, in this paper our focus will be limited to struc-
tural patterns of social relations, the negotiation protocol and agents cognitive ac-
curacy. Multiple simulations were conducted for each set of parameter values
investigated. However, for ease of communication, we will present below selected re-
sults in graphic form based on the following set of common assumptions: (i) the total
number of shares the seller can transfer either to the active investor or to the small
investors is set at 100; (ii) control is reached with 50% of the shares, i.e., m ¼ 0:50;
3
(iii) the number of messages n  that represents the threshold after which agents will
give upnegotiation is set at 40;
4 (iv) during negotiation, all the agents use the same
protocol, and therefore the concession rate c is assumed to be the same across the
three types of agents;
5 and (v) we assume that the sellers degree of cognitive accu-
racy is reﬂected by the same value for the standard deviation across all the random
variables, namely rPre ¼ rDis ¼ rICs.
6
To ensure that the ﬁndings reported here are not idiosyncratic and do not depend
primarily on the above assumptions, we conducted a stability analysis for a variety
of instantiations of the model. This eﬀort included a sensitivity analysis to determine
that performance does not vary substantially across changes in those parameter val-
ues held constant in the results reported here, and across changes in many combina-
tions of them. However, even with a predeﬁned set of initial structural conditions
(number of shares, control percentage, commitment threshold, homogeneity of pro-
tocols and standard deviations across agents), there still exists considerable variation
among the possible negotiation processes that match these characteristics. Thus, to
ensure that the results reported here reﬂect the underlying structure of the model and
not merely particular realisations of a highly stochastic process, we used a Monte
Carlo approach to average out diﬀerences arising from distinct independently spec-
iﬁed instantiations of all the remaining structural parameters, including those cha-
racterising the agents mental states (e.g. beliefs; sensitivity factor). Our ﬁndings
3 For simplicity, the analysis does not consider more realistic situations in which control can be reached
with less than 50% of the shares, such as economic transactions in which voting rights can be isolated from
cash ﬂow rights [47].
4 We consider this value a reasonable compromise between the case in which the agents are highly
reluctant to concede and, therefore, are prone to exit negotiation ‘‘too early’’, and the case in which the
agents are ‘‘fanatical’’ and keepnegotiating until they reach an agreement.
5 A more in-depth analysis should take into account those scenarios in which the seller, the active
investor and the small investors use diﬀerent concession rates and, therefore, diﬀer in terms of using more
or less conciliatory negotiation protocols. In this case, the impact of diﬀerent combinations of the agents
negotiation protocols upon negotiation performance could be systematically studied. We leave such
reﬁnements for future work.
6 Obviously, the seller could have diﬀerent degrees of cognitive accuracy depending on the object of his
beliefs. For example, he might be perfectly accurate about the active investors position, but highly
inaccurate when it comes to expressing a belief about the small investors. The impact of diﬀerent
combinations of standard deviations is another topic we leave for future work.
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This amounts to 7200 runs for the ﬁrst set of simulations, and 9000 for the second
one.
5. Results and analysis
One beneﬁt of using agent-based computational models for studying organisa-
tional processes is that they can provide researchers with data at both the individual
agents and the groups level. Here, we use our agent-based model of negotiation to
explore the role of social inﬂuence in the generation of interpersonal agreements. We
focus on two questions. First, to what extent does social structure interact with social
behaviour to impact on inﬂuence? To address this question, we undertake a ﬁrst set
of simulations in which we examine the individual and combined impact that the sell-
ing strategy and the concession rate have on the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of the
sale (Section 5.1). The second question we explore is the impact of social structure
and cognition on social inﬂuence. To analyse this issue, we undertake a second set
of simulations in which we examine the individual and combined eﬀect that the sell-
ing strategy and the accuracy of the sellers beliefs have on the eﬀectiveness and ef-
ﬁciency of the sale (Section 5.2). This will shed light on what are normally hidden
cognitive processes. Results will allow us to investigate the relation between cognitive
accuracy and information and, in turn, how this relation aﬀects the relative perfor-
mance of various structural patterns of social inﬂuence that diﬀer in terms of the type
and amount of information conveyed.
5.1. Negotiation protocol and social interaction
We begin by exploring the interrelationship between selling strategy and negotia-
tion protocol, and their impact on the performance of the sale. In so doing, we will
ﬁrstly undertake a comparative analysis of the selling strategies across diﬀerent pro-
tocols, and secondly we will determine the impact that the protocol has on the eﬀec-
tiveness and eﬃciency of the sale when diﬀerent selling strategies are used.
Fig. 1 shows the impact that each combination of selling strategy and concession
rate has upon the revenue raised in the aggregate sell of shares. In terms of a com-
parative analysis between selling strategies across diﬀerent protocols, we ﬁnd that,
throughout all protocols, public oﬀering at a uniform price (strategy D) is the selling
strategy that keeps revenue at the lowest levels. Conversely, involving an active in-
vestor in the sale of the ﬁrm is, in general, a more eﬀective strategy than a sale of
all shares to small investors. This suggests that social inﬂuence becomes more eﬀec-
tive as the heterogeneity of the actors involved increases. In terms of our model,
there appear to be two major reasons for such a result. First, a large investor can
use a controlling block to obtain private beneﬁts and is, therefore, willing to pay a
price that reﬂects such private beneﬁts of control (Section 3.1). This, in turn, allows
the seller to raise the price asked for a controlling block by a premium over the price
at which dispersed shareholdings can be oﬀered (Section 3.2). Second, because a
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managements decisions and increase the ﬁrms expected cash ﬂows, all shareholders,
and in particular the small investors, can beneﬁt from the participation of a large in-
vestor in the sale. As a result, the seller is in a position to ask the small investors for a
higher price that in turn reﬂects the public good associated with the active investors
monitoring activities.
Not only does Fig. 1 suggest that the sale of a ﬁrm should be designed to promote
the participation of an active investor. It can also be used to derive interesting impli-
cations as to how the active investor should be involved in the sale when diﬀerent
protocols are adopted. As it turns out, strategy A is especially eﬀective when the
agents use low concession rates. At medium and high levels of this parameter, strat-
egy B generates higher revenue than the alternative selling strategies. It produces the
best results between 0.10 and 0.125 and between 0.15 and 0.20. It has a local max-
imum at 0.10 and a local minimum at 0.175. However, even at 0.175, strategy B is
more eﬀective than the other strategies. Finally, the parallel strategy (strategy C)
gives lower revenue than both strategies A and B (except for the lowest value of
the concession rate), but higher than the simple public oﬀering (strategy D).
An inspection of these results, therefore, not only suggests that it is crucial that
the method of sale should promote the participation of an active investor, but also
that the involvement of the active investor in the sale should occur after a transaction
with the small investors has taken place. In this case, the sale is, on average, more
eﬀective because the seller can extract the surplus associated with the active investor
by making his allocation and payment contingent on the demands of the small inves-
tors [47]. Overall, what these results suggest is that the eﬀectiveness of social inﬂu-
ence depends not only on the heterogeneity of the agents involved, but also on the
temporal order in which the agents are approached and on the type of information
that is used to exercise inﬂuence. This emphasises the impact of the social structure
Fig. 1. The impact of structural patterns of social inﬂuence on negotiation eﬀectiveness with diﬀerent pro-
tocols.
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pends on the network of social relations in which it is located, on the order in which
interactions occur within the network, and on the type of information that these in-
teractions convey.
Fig. 2 shows the impact that each combination of selling strategy and concession
rate has upon the number of messages sent. In terms of a comparative analysis be-
tween strategies, these results suggest that, throughout all negotiation protocols,
public oﬀering keeps the number of messages at the lowest levels. Since in public of-
fering the seller communicates only with the small investors, we ﬁnd that the number
of messages is positively correlated with the degree of heterogeneity of the agents
among which an agreement must be made. Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ between eﬀec-
tiveness and eﬃciency as the investors heterogeneity is manipulated. In fact, on av-
erage, an increase in eﬀectiveness resulting from the participation of an active
investor in the sale can be obtained only at the cost of lower eﬃciency resulting from
the increased heterogeneity of the agents involved.
Moreover, Fig. 2 shows that, throughout all negotiation protocols, parallel strat-
egy C works better than both sequential strategies A and B, but is worse than strat-
egy D. This means that the negative eﬀects (in terms of more messages) of an increase
in the heterogeneity of the agents involved can be mitigated if the seller interacts si-
multaneously with all the investors rather than with sequential negotiations. Finally,
at low and medium values of the concession rate, strategy B is more eﬃcient than
strategy A, whereas at high values of the concession rate strategy A is better than
strategy B. This suggests that the relative beneﬁts (in terms of eﬃciency) of diﬀerent
ways of interacting sequentially depend on the agents social behaviour and interac-
tion style. When they are conciliatory and interact sequentially, an agreement can
be reached more quickly if negotiation with the small investors is subsequent to
Fig. 2. The impact of structural patterns of social inﬂuence on negotiation eﬃciency with diﬀerent proto-
cols.
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persistent and stick to their own initial positions, making information contingent on
prior negotiation with the small investors and using this information to inﬂuence the
active investor allows the seller to reach an agreement more quickly.
In combination, Figs. 1 and 2 reveal the existence of individual and combined ef-
fects of selling strategy and negotiation protocol on negotiation performance. Under
each of the protocols here considered, the choice of a selling strategy has an impact
on the revenue raised and the number of messages sent. In particular, strategy B, in
general, turns out to be more eﬀective than other alternative strategies (except for the
lowest level of the concession rate), whereas simple public oﬀering is strictly more
eﬃcient than alternative strategies. Furthermore, under each of the selling strategies,
the choice of the negotiation protocol impacts upon revenue and number of mes-
sages. When the agents try to inﬂuence one another by adhering to a speciﬁc struc-
tural pattern of interaction, performance is ultimately aﬀected by how persistent the
agents are in sticking to their initial views. To gain a deeper insight into the relative
impact of negotiation protocol on performance when diﬀerent selling strategies are
used, we performed a regression analysis on the simulation data shown in Figs. 1
and 2.
The regressions in Table 1 indicate that, on average, the protocol has a strong
negative eﬀect on eﬀectiveness: the more conciliatory the agents are, the lower the
price at which the ﬁrm is sold. Here an obvious question is: What is driving revenue
down as the concession rate increases? The answer is found in the role of the conces-
sion rate within the agents negotiation protocol. The agents use the concession rate
to modify the unacceptable oﬀers they receive. The higher this parameter is, the more
signiﬁcant the modiﬁcation that is made (Section 3.3). This, in turn, might have two
alternative consequences: (i) the seller makes more concessions and the ﬁrm is sold at
Table 1
Regression analysis for performance on negotiation protocol (concession rate)
Independent variables Eﬀectiveness (revenue) Eﬃciency (number of messages)
Standardised
regression
coeﬃcient
R2 Adjusted
R2
Standardised
regression
coeﬃcient
R2 Adjusted
R2
Protocola )0.965  0.931 0.913 )0.927   0.860 0.825
()7.334) ()4.954)
Protocol   Strategy A )0.995    0.989 0.986 )0.949  0.901 0.876
()19.064) ()6.036)
Protocol   Strategy B )0.808  0.652 0.565 )0.945  0.893 0.866
()2.704) ()5.774)
Protocol   Strategy C )0.988    0.976 0.970 )0.655 0.429 0.286
()12.742) ()1.732)
Protocol   Strategy D )0.831  0.691 0.614 )0.645 0.529 0.386
()2.992) ()1.722)
Note: For each cell, this is a regression of the six means in Figs. 1 and 2. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics.  p < 0:05;   p < 0:01;    p < 0:001.
aRegression coeﬃcients for the average performance across the four selling strategies.
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higher price. Therefore, the decrease in revenue as the concession rate increases ex-
presses the fact that, on average, the impact of the modiﬁcation made by the seller on
revenue is stronger than the impact of the modiﬁcation made by the investors.
When interaction eﬀects between protocol and selling strategy are controlled,
Table 1 allows for a comparative analysis of the impact of the negotiation protocol
on the sale across diﬀerent selling strategies. In particular, the negative impact of
protocol on revenue is stronger if strategies A and C are used, whereas it turns
out to be weaker under strategies B and D. Furthermore, an increase in the conces-
sion rate generates the most signiﬁcant decrease in eﬀectiveness in connection with
strategy A, and the least signiﬁcant one with strategy B. Interacting ﬁrst with the
small investors and then with the active investor enables the seller to exercise social
inﬂuence in the most beneﬁcial manner as his social behaviour becomes more concil-
iatory. This means that, as the seller becomes more conciliatory, the overall beneﬁts
of exercising inﬂuence through the exchange of information are greater when the in-
formation is made contingent on prior interactions with the small investors (strategy
B) than when it is made contingent on prior interactions with the active investor
(strategy A) or on simultaneous interactions (strategy C). Finally, when only the
small investors are involved in the sale (strategy D), the negative eﬀects of protocol
on revenue are less signiﬁcant than those produced when strategies A and C are used,
but stronger than the eﬀects generated in connection with strategy B. This suggests
that, in general, as the concession rate increases, exercising inﬂuence on less hetero-
geneous agents allows the seller to decrease the loss in revenue associated with his
more conciliatory behaviour. However, as the concession rate increases, this loss
can be further reduced if an active investor is involved in negotiation and the seller
decides to inﬂuence him using information contingent on prior interactions with the
small investors (strategy B).
Perhaps the most interesting pattern in Table 1 comes from comparison of the
same variable across outcomes. Whereas the protocol has negative eﬀects on eﬀec-
tiveness, it has a positive impact on eﬃciency. On average, the number of messages
decreases as the concession rate increases. That is, the more signiﬁcant the conces-
sions the agents make to one another, the lower the number of messages that need
to be sent in order for an agreement to be reached. This suggests that there is a
trade-oﬀ between eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency. On average, when the agents choose
to be more conciliatory with each other, they can reach an agreement more quickly,
but the ﬁrm is sold at a lower price. However, as with eﬀectiveness, when interaction
eﬀects between protocol and selling strategy are controlled, a comparative analysis
shows that the relative impact of protocol on eﬃciency changes across selling strat-
egies. Strategies A and B emphasise the role of the protocol, whereas strategies C and
D turn out to mitigate the eﬀects of a change in the concession rate. Strategy A is the
strategy under which an increase in the concession rate generates the most signiﬁcant
increase in eﬃciency. This suggests that interaction with the small investors subse-
quent to negotiation with the active investor allows the seller to obtain the greatest
beneﬁts from a more conciliatory social behaviour in terms of reaching an agreement
more quickly. However, this selling strategy will also generate the most signiﬁcant
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to improve eﬃciency with a more conciliatory behaviour, he must choose whether to
get the most from this decision in terms of reducing the time to agreement but at the
same time give upthe most in terms of loss of revenue (by using strategy A), or to
give upsome beneﬁts in terms of time to agreement but at the same time get the most
in terms of the lowest possible loss of revenue (by using strategy B). Finally, the
positive eﬀects of protocol on eﬃciency are the least signiﬁcant when only the small
investors are involved in the sale (strategy D). This suggests that the more heteroge-
neous the negotiating agents are, the more beneﬁcial the overall eﬀects of being more
conciliatory on the time it takes to make an agreement.
5.2. Cognitive accuracy and the value of information
So far, we have analysed the impact that selling strategy and negotiation protocol
have on performance, under the assumption that no shift occurs in the agents cog-
nitive representations of their environment. In the following set of simulations, we
extend our analysis to a setting in which inﬂuence is exercised under diﬀerent degrees
of cognitive accuracy.
Fig. 3 shows the impact that each combination of selling strategy and degree of
cognitive accuracy has upon the revenue raised in the aggregate sell of shares (nego-
tiation eﬀectiveness). We begin the analysis of these ﬁndings by investigating the ef-
fects that an increase in the amount of the information used to exert social inﬂuence
has on eﬀectiveness, and to what extent these eﬀects depend on the agents cognitive
accuracy.
At high degrees of cognitive accuracy, strategy B does not work well. This result
contrasts with the performance of strategy B* that, at high degrees of cognitive ac-
curacy, gives the highest revenue. How can this phenomenon be explained? The an-
Fig. 3. The impact of structural patterns of social inﬂuence on negotiation eﬀectiveness at diﬀerent levels
of cognitive accuracy.
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the agents self-conﬁdence during negotiation, which in turn depends on how accu-
rate the agents cognitive representations are. At higher degrees of cognitive accu-
racy, the agents are more self-conﬁdent and, therefore, become more reluctant to
make proposals and counter-proposals that deviate from the average value of their
price range. This, in turn, might have two consequences: (i) it might be the case that
the sellers price range will never overlap with either the active investors or the small
investors price range; or (ii) the overlapping area of the agents price ranges becomes
narrower as the spread between the minimum the seller is willing to accept and the
maximum the investors are willing to oﬀer becomes lower. In the former case, nego-
tiation fails and no agreement is made. In the latter, it may become more diﬃcult to
settle for a price that is acceptable to both parties. In such situations, agreement may
be reached in a more eﬀective way if the agents inﬂuence one another by exchanging
more information so as to support their requests during negotiation.
Fig. 3 indicates that, at high degrees of cognitive accuracy, the more informative
strategy B* is more eﬀective than its variant B as well as strategy C. For example,
when the sellers beliefs are perfectly accurate (i.e. the standard deviation is zero),
strategy B* gives the highest revenue, about 1394.98, whereas strategy B gives only
600 since no agreement is made between the seller and the active investor. This is be-
cause, with strategy B*, the seller inﬂuences the active investor by communicating an
additional piece of information so as to justify the oﬀer made. In turn, a greater
amount of information helps the two agents to reach an agreement. These results
have a two-fold implication. Firstly, on average, increasing the amount of informa-
tion for social inﬂuence purposes improves eﬀectiveness. Secondly, the impact of in-
creasing the amount of information on eﬀectiveness depends on the agents cognitive
accuracy. In particular, our ﬁndings suggest that the beneﬁts (in terms of more eﬀec-
tiveness) of using more information are emphasised as cognitive accuracy increases.
Another result that emerges from Fig. 3 is that, at medium and low degrees of
cognitive accuracy, a public oﬀering of all shares at a uniform price is associated with
the worst performance. At such degrees of accuracy, promoting the participation of
an active investor in the sale and, therefore, increasing the heterogeneity of the
agents involved improve the eﬀectiveness of negotiation. In particular, at medium
and low degrees of cognitive accuracy, strategy C mostly dominates strategy D.
Thus, with strategy C, the small investors, who are informed of the ongoing simul-
taneous negotiation with an active investor, are more eﬀectively inﬂuenced to accept
the oﬀer than they are with strategy D where social inﬂuence is exerted only by
oﬀering a price with no additional information. On the other hand, strategy A dom-
inates strategy C: providing the small investors with information about the control-
ling block sold at an earlier stage is therefore more eﬀective than providing them with
information about a parallel negotiation simultaneously carried out with the active
investor. The impact of social inﬂuence that the seller exerts on the active investor
shows a similar pattern. Most of the time, at medium and low levels of cognitive ac-
curacy, strategy B is more eﬀective than strategy C. Again, this result is explained by
the additional information conveyed by strategy B and used to persuade the active
investor to accept the price oﬀered.
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cognitive accuracy has upon the number of messages sent (negotiation eﬃciency).
Throughout all levels of cognitive accuracy, the lowest number of messages is asso-
ciated with strategy D. Once again, this result suggests that the number of messages
is positively correlated with the heterogeneity of the agents among which an agree-
ment must be made (public oﬀering involves only small investors). Thus, at medium
and low degrees of cognitive accuracy, we ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ between eﬀectiveness and
eﬃciency as the investors heterogeneity is manipulated. In fact, at such degrees of
accuracy, the participation of an active investor in the sale brings about an increase
in eﬀectiveness only at the cost of lower eﬃciency.
Not only does Fig. 4 suggest that, to improve eﬃciency, the participation of an
active investor in the sale should be promoted. It also allows for a comparative anal-
ysis between alternative strategies in which an active investor is involved, thus sug-
gesting a set of implications as to how his participation should be designed. On
average, strategy B* requires fewer messages than strategy B. This suggests that,
when the active investor is approached after negotiation with the small investors, in-
creasing the amount of information helps the seller to inﬂuence the active investor
and reach an agreement more quickly. However, not only does Fig. 4 show that us-
ing more information speeds up negotiation; it also reveals that these positive eﬀects
of information are emphasised at high degrees of cognitive accuracy. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that, on average, strategy B* also works better than strategy A in terms of
keeping the number of messages at a lower level. Thus, social inﬂuence is more eﬃ-
cient when information is made contingent on prior negotiation with the small inves-
tors rather than on prior negotiation with the active investor. Since what information
is used and in what order it is forwarded depend on the pattern of interaction in
which inﬂuence unfolds, once again this result indicates the existence of an interac-
tion between social structure and social inﬂuence. In addition, at medium and low
Fig. 4. The impact of structural patterns of social inﬂuence on negotiation eﬃciency at diﬀerent levels of
cognitive accuracy.
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strategy. Interacting sequentially rather than simultaneously has diﬀerent implica-
tions in terms of the information that can be produced and exchanged, and this in
turn generates diﬀering results in terms of how quickly inﬂuence can be exercised.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows that, on average, strategy A is less eﬃcient than strategy C:
here, the eﬀect of inﬂuencing the small investors with information contingent on
prior negotiation with the active investor seems to be weaker than the eﬀect of inﬂu-
encing the active investor with information contingent on simultaneous negotiation
with the small investors.
To gain a deeper insight into the relative eﬀect of cognitive accuracy on perfor-
mance across all ﬁve selling strategies, we conducted a regression analysis on the sim-
ulation data shown in Figs. 3 and 4. Table 2 suggests that, on average, cognitive
accuracy has a positive eﬀect on eﬀectiveness: the higher the degree of cognitive ac-
curacy, the higher the revenue raised. We noted above that, as their cognitive accu-
racy increases, the agents become more self-conﬁdent and increase the concentration
of the possible prices they could oﬀer during negotiation around an average value. In
the light of this, one way of interpreting the result in Table 2 is that, the higher the
degree of cognitive accuracy, the higher the minimum price that the seller is willing
to accept from either the small investors or the active investor and, hence, the higher
the price that may eventually be agreed upon. Thus, on average, as the sellersc o g -
nitive representations become more accurate, the inﬂuence that he can exercise on his
counter-parts becomes more eﬀective in terms of a higher price at which the ﬁrm is
sold.
Table 2
Regression analysis for performance on cognitive accuracy
Independent variables Eﬀectiveness (revenue) Eﬃciency (number of messages)
Standardised
regression
coeﬃcient
R2 Adjusted
R2
Standardised
regression
coeﬃcient
R2 Adjusted
R2
Cognitive accuracya 0.344 0.118 )0.102 0.783 0.613 0.517
(0.733) (2.519)
Cog. Acc.   Strategy A )0.665 0.442 0.302 0.912  0.831 0.789
()1.779) (4.440)
Cog. Acc.   Strategy B )0.721 0.520 0.400 0.905  0.819 0.774
()2.081) (4.252)
Cog. Acc.   Strategy B* 0.987    0.973 0.967 0.115 0.013 )0.233
(12.120) (0.232)
Cog. Acc   Strategy C 0.861  0.740 0.676 )0.680 0.463 0.329
(3.378) ()1.857)
Cog. Acc.   Strategy D 0.851 0.780 0.696 )0.670 0.473 0.339
(3.368) ()1.867)
Note: For each cell, this is a regression of the 6 means in Figs. 3 and 4. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics.  p < 0:05;   p < 0:01;    p < 0:001.
aRegression coeﬃcients for the average performance across the ﬁve selling strategies.
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ever, when we look at the interaction eﬀects between accuracy and selling strategy,
Table 2 complements our ﬁndings in three important respects. First, the beneﬁts of
an increase in accuracy are emphasised when strategy B* is used. As noted above,
strategy B* is associated with the case where more information is exchanged among
the agents. When more information is exchanged, the eﬀects of an increase in cognitive
accuracy can be fully exploited, and this ampliﬁes the gain that can be obtained in ef-
fectiveness. Thus, information and cognitive accuracy complement each other in their
impact on eﬀectiveness: whereas the eﬀects of using more information are emphasised
when accuracy is high, the eﬀects of an increase in accuracy are emphasised when more
information is used. Second, having more accurate beliefs has positive eﬀects on eﬀec-
tiveness also when strategies C and D are used, but in this case the eﬀects are lower
than with strategy B*. This suggests that, as cognitive accuracy increases, the seller
is most successful in increasing the revenue obtained from the sale when he inﬂuences
theactiveinvestorbylettinghimknowthemarketpricepreviouslyestablishedwiththe
small investors. In contrast, as cognitive accuracy increases, the increase in revenue be-
comes lower if the seller negotiates simultaneously with the active investor and the
small investors, or if only the small investors are involved in negotiation.
Finally, Table 2 shows that the impact of cognitive accuracy on eﬀectiveness is
negative when strategies A and B are used. Under these strategies, increasing the ac-
curacy of the sellers beliefs generates lower revenue. As Fig. 3 suggests, this result is
determined by the fact that at high levels of accuracy, both strategies do not work
well. When the amount of the information exchanged is not suﬃciently high and so-
cial inﬂuence is exercised in sequential interactions using information contingent on
previous negotiations, increasing accuracy may not be enough to improve the agents
self-conﬁdence. In this case, an increase in cognitive accuracy may even make the
seller aware that the information he can use to inﬂuence his counter-parts is inade-
quate, and this can make him inclined to make more concessions and accept a lower
price. This negative eﬀect of accuracy on eﬀectiveness is emphasised particularly
when strategy B is used. This means that as accuracy increases the seller becomes less
self-conﬁdent when he has to interact ﬁrst with the small investors and then with the
active investors rather than in the opposite order. Self-conﬁdence is therefore most
undermined precisely under that selling strategy that, when the right amount of in-
formation is exchanged, allows an increase in cognitive accuracy to generate the
most signiﬁcant increase in revenue.
When we look at the impact of cognitive accuracy on eﬃciency, Table 2 shows
that, on average, the more accurate the agents beliefs are, the longer it takes to reach
an agreement. As we noted above, the reason for this is that, as cognitive accuracy
increases, the agents become more self-conﬁdent and, accordingly, more reluctant to
oﬀer prices that deviate from an average one. This makes it more diﬃcult for the
agents to converge on a ﬁnal price, thus increasing the number of messages that need
to be exchanged before an agreement is reached. Thus, Table 2 shows that there is a
trade-oﬀ between eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency as accuracy is manipulated. In fact, on
average, an increase in eﬀectiveness as a result of an improvement in cognitive accu-
racy can be obtained only at the cost of lower eﬃciency.
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egy interact to impact on eﬃciency. Table 2 shows that an increase in accuracy has
the strongest negative impact on eﬃciency when sequential strategies A and B are
used. However, things are diﬀerent when strategy B* is used. Here, a change in ac-
curacy does not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on eﬃciency. Therefore, not only does strat-
egy B* require, on average, fewer messages than strategies A and B, as shown in Fig.
4, but it also turns out to be the most appropriate selling strategy under which accu-
racy can be increased to obtain the maximum increase in revenue, yet minimising the
increase in the time it takes to reach an agreement. This result suggests that the pos-
itive eﬀects on eﬃciency of using more information to exercise social inﬂuence are
likely to mitigate the negative eﬀects of having more accurate beliefs and therefore
being more self-conﬁdent in negotiation. When additional information is exchanged,
the seller can easily impact on the active investors mental state: even though he be-
comes more self-conﬁdent as a result of more accurate beliefs, nonetheless it takes
only a few more messages to eﬀectively inﬂuence the active investor to accept a
higher price. In contrast, when the amount of information is limited, like with strat-
egies A and B, increasing accuracy not only generates lower revenue, but also has a
strong negative impact on eﬃciency. The reason is that, as accuracy increases, the
seller adjusts his price range by decreasing the maximum price and increasing the
minimum price he will ask in negotiation. Whereas the former adjustment deter-
mines acceptance of a ﬁnal lower price, the latter generates an increase in the number
of messages that need to be exchanged before an agreement is reached.
Finally, Table 2 shows that when strategies C and D are used, the impact of ac-
curacy on eﬃciency becomes positive. Under both strategies, increasing accuracy de-
termines an improvement in eﬃciency. However, the reasons for this pattern are
diﬀerent depending on what strategy is used. Under strategy C, the adjustments in
the sellers price range induced by an increase in his accuracy are such that the eﬀects
of decreasing the maximum acceptable price (in terms of less time to agreement) are
stronger than the eﬀects of increasing the minimum acceptable price (in terms of
more time to agreement). Thus, when the seller chooses a simultaneous pattern of
interaction rather than a sequential one, the eﬀects of an increase in cognitive accu-
racy are two-fold. On the one hand, the increase in the minimum acceptable price
eventually determines higher revenue; on the other, the decrease in the maximum
price speeds up the process by making the sellers possible oﬀers more likely to be
accepted. This explains the increase in both eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency in strategy
C as accuracy increases.
The same pattern emerges with strategy D. However, in this case the positive ef-
fects of increasing accuracy on eﬃciency are connected to the fact that the seller is
interacting only with one class of investors, namely the small investors. In general,
interacting with fewer classes of investors reduces the opportunities of selling the
ﬁrm. Thus, when an increase in accuracy is combined with a decrease in the hetero-
geneity of the agents involved in negotiation, the sellers price adjustments are made
in such a way that his disposition to require a higher price as a result of his increased
self-conﬁdence is mitigated by the need to reduce the risk of jeopardising the whole
operation by making too high oﬀers to only one class of investors. This explains the
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sellers minimum acceptable price guarantees a suﬃciently high ﬁnal price, the de-
crease in his maximum price speeds up the process by inducing the seller to oﬀer a
suﬃciently low price that will be accepted more quickly.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Research on social inﬂuence can typically be organised into a variety of distinct
problem areas, such as social conformity [24,26,27], group polarisation [9,56,81], mi-
nority inﬂuence [54,57], power [20,52] and persuasion [10,58]. Despite the diﬀerences
in their theoretical and methodological orientations, scholars across all these re-
search areas can be uniﬁed by a widespread acceptance of the same paradigmatic
model for conceptualising social inﬂuence. At the heart of this model, usually re-
ferred to as the ‘‘dual-process model’’ [24], is the recognition that there are two con-
ceptually distinct processes of social inﬂuence that often co-occur in every-day life:
informational and normative social inﬂuence. Informational inﬂuence is deﬁned as
inﬂuence to accept information from another as evidence about reality. Normative
inﬂuence is inﬂuence to conform to the positive expectations of another in order
to gain approval or avoid rejection. Thus, whereas informational inﬂuence refers
to cognitively motivated processes aﬀecting the ‘‘private’’ side of an individuals iden-
tity, normative inﬂuence is concerned with socially motivated processes aﬀecting the
‘‘public’’ side of an individuals identity. As it stands, this dichotomy poses many
problems since it is based on the assumption ﬁrst that informational inﬂuence cannot
be socially mediated, second that social norms have no eﬀect on individual attitude
change [80]. This assumption reﬂects an antagonism between individual and society.
It suggests that the role of social structure and interaction is only to constrain indi-
viduals behaviour, whereas change in individuals mental attitudes results only from
information-based, cognitive and asocial processes.
Attempts have been made to address the problems posed by the distinction be-
tween informational and normative inﬂuence. A variety of theories have been pro-
posed that, while retaining the insights of the dual-process model, try to integrate
inﬂuence phenomena within a uniﬁed conceptual scheme more consistent with
empirical data and endowed with more explanatory power [1,82]. From a social
psychological perspective, the most inﬂuential of these attempts has been the self-cat-
egorisation theory [78,79]. The hallmark of this theory is the idea that the individual,
the social context and social norms are strictly intertwined, and that society aﬀects
and shapes the cognitive activities of the individual and vice versa. In organisation
studies, this idea of co-evolution between the social world and the individuals cog-
nitive worlds has been further developed by the constructural theory [12,13]. Accord-
ing to this theory, self construction and social reconstruction are parallel processes:
social changes result from changes in the distribution of knowledge as individuals
interact, acquire and communicate information.
Both the self-categorisation and the constructural theory pave the way for a
uniﬁed perspective in our understanding of social inﬂuence in several respects.
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the idea that the basic inﬂuence process is one where the normative positions of peo-
ple tend to be cognitively accepted as valid, and the validity of information is cog-
nitively established by the social context and social norms. Individuals shift towards
persuasive material and change their cognitive worlds accordingly, but what is per-
suasive is not a matter of information that can be abstracted from the social context
in which interactions occur. In contrast, it can be argued that the degree to which
information is persuasive depends on the degree to which it has been validated
through its connections with an underpinning social structure in which individu-
als engage in social interactions, communicate messages, acquire and disseminate
knowledge.
The model we proposed in this paper is an attempt to reﬁne thinking on these
matters. By developing a view of social inﬂuence that is predicated on the interrela-
tions among individuals cognition, principles of social behaviour and structural pat-
terns of social relations, an eﬀort has been made to integrate cognitively oriented
informational inﬂuence and socially based normative inﬂuence into a uniﬁed theoret-
ical perspective. In our model, the social world and the individual cognitive processes
are brought together in an integrated explanation in which information has validity
and impacts on agents mental states to the degree that it reﬂects the social structure
and the social interactions through which it is generated and exchanged. For exam-
ple, the role of the additional piece of information included in strategy B* depends
on a combination of social and cognitive factors. It impacts on the active investors
mental state as long as it is forwarded to the active investor by the seller, and pro-
vided that a social relationshipwith the small investors has already taken p lace.
The strength of its impact also depends on whether or not the active investor believes
that the seller is trustworthy which, in turn, determines whether or not the active in-
vestor believes that the message received from the seller is correct.
The idea of interdependence between cognitively and socially motivated processes
of inﬂuence is also reﬂected in our conceptualisation of the agent who exerts, and is
subjected to, social inﬂuence. The agent is here regarded as a cognitive associative
social entity, engaged in an iterated series of social actions and interactions aimed
at completing its mental state [61]. In our model, besides providing new reasons
for keeping individually motivated attitudes, the social world in which the agent is
located also oﬀers mental attitudes that can be adopted to complement or merely
to change its individual mental state. The complex interplay between the cognitive
and the social world turns out to be a process in which social inﬂuence plays a
key function in complementing and augmenting the agents bare individual mental
attitudes with socially motivated ones. In this view, social inﬂuence is a socio-cogni-
tive process that impacts on the agents cognition through the social context in which
the agents are located and the social interactions in which they are involved. Embed-
ded in a structural pattern of social relations, agents interact and by interacting they
persuade each other of the validity of each others views. Informational validity, in
turn, has a social-normative aspect: it is aﬀected by social interactions between
agents within varying social contexts, embodied in the agents social identity and
groupmembership s. Inﬂuence generates attitude change in the agents  mental states
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and in turn they accept information as valid precisely because it is generated and
gathered within a speciﬁc social context and as a result of a range of social interac-
tions with other agents.
In this paper, we explored the properties of our conception of social inﬂuence by
focusing on the negotiation process that underlies the sale of a privately held com-
pany through the public oﬀering of shares and through the involvement of an active
investor. We then ran a series of simulations to examine the eﬀects of social inﬂuence
in terms of the performance of the sale. In doing this, we systematically analysed so-
cial inﬂuence in terms of its underpinning cognitive, social and structural compo-
nents, and we studied the individual and combined eﬀects of these components on
the performance of the sale. Agents cognition has been formalised drawing on tra-
ditional BDI architectures [17,68,84], and the role that cognition has in determining
how eﬀectively and eﬃciently social inﬂuence is exercised has been examined by ma-
nipulating cognitive accuracy. We also concentrated on social interactions among
agents and we formalised them in terms of the negotiation protocol that the agents
use to initiate and maintain social processes with others. Finally, we focused on a set
of stable patterns of social relationships that provide the agents with the structural
context in which they can exercise social inﬂuence.
The proposed model has considerable explanatory power. Many of its implica-
tions are consistent with known ﬁndings both in research on staged equity ﬁnancing
and, more generally, in research on social inﬂuence undertaken from a variety of the-
oretical perspectives. New theoretical insights can also be derived from the model.
Overall, our results indicate that social inﬂuence matters in the generation of inter-
personal agreements between the seller of a ﬁrm and potential investors. Diﬀerent
ways of exercising inﬂuence have diﬀering impacts on the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency
of the process of agreement generation. More speciﬁcally, we found that the eﬀects of
social inﬂuence on performance depend on how persistent the agents are in sticking
to their initial views. Additionally, our results show that social inﬂuence is aﬀected
by the agents cognitive accuracy. For example, we found that, on average, the im-
pact that social inﬂuence has on eﬀectiveness becomes weaker as the sellers beliefs
become less accurate. Our results also shed light on what are normally hidden cog-
nitive processes. In fact, we found that cognitive accuracy and information reinforce
each other in their impact on performance. Whereas high accuracy emphasises the
positive eﬀects on eﬀectiveness of an increase in the amount of information, using
more information ampliﬁes the possible gains in eﬀectiveness that result from an in-
crease in accuracy. In turn, this interaction between cognitive accuracy and informa-
tion aﬀects the relative performance of the proposed range of structural patterns of
interaction that diﬀer in terms of the amount and type of the information conveyed.
More interestingly, our ﬁndings indicated that when it comes to deciding how to ex-
ercise inﬂuence, agents are confronted with trade-oﬀs. For example, on average, an
increase in eﬀectiveness as a result of an improvement in cognitive accuracy can be
obtained only at the cost of lower eﬃciency. In addition, when the agents choose to
be more conciliatory with each other, they can exercise inﬂuence more eﬃciently, but
only to the detriment of eﬀectiveness.
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advantages of using computational techniques and simulations for studying social
and organisational processes [11,14,44]. First, it allowed us to simultaneously ex-
plore a range of structural, social and cognitive factors and their relative impacts
on a complex process such as social inﬂuence. In our eﬀort to build a plausible
model of negotiation in which social inﬂuence is exercised in connection with the
process of going public, we tried to rely on established theories and available evi-
dence in behavioural ﬁnance. However, even though the individual components of
the model are fairly well understood, we suspected that their combined eﬀect was
not. Thus, using computational techniques, we simulated these components to-
gether over time, and this allowed us to yield valuable insights into diﬀerent com-
binations of modelling factors. Second, using simulations, we could study social
inﬂuence, in terms of its antecedents, components and consequences, more easily,
more systematically and with less cost than would be the case if we had conducted
surveys, case or ﬁeld studies. Our research domain is a good example of the relative
advantages of simulations in situations in which real-life experimentation with real
subjects would be prohibitively expensive, if not impossible, and the complexity of
the social and cognitive processes involved too high to be successfully handled.
Third, by operationalising an important but diﬃcult-to-measure determinant of
performance, such as cognitive accuracy, we could explore unanticipated properties
of cognitive processes at both the individual and collective level [15]. One of these
properties, for example, is the relation between self-conﬁdence, information and
cognitive accuracy, and the role that this relation has in aﬀecting the performance
of social inﬂuence.
Finally, it is important to point out that the model we developed is undoubtedly
incomplete and a number of issues raised in this paper require further investigation.
Our ﬁndings are best regarded as hypotheses, and considerably more analysis and
research need to be done before they can be considered as anything more than mere
conjectures. We developed our computational model building on extant empirical
evidence; even so, however, the model did not prove any of the hypotheses it helped
develop. It merely allowed us to derive empirically veriﬁable predictions by answer-
ing logical ‘‘what if’’ questions. To prove these predictions, future empirical studies
are needed for validating our model and testing our ﬁndings against real data. Fur-
thermore, even though our main interests here lie in the generation of interpersonal
agreements in complexly diﬀerentiated social systems, nonetheless our modelling
strategy could also be applied to the study of the generation of other higher-order
forms of cognition, such as organisational culture [34], organisational competence
[65], and organisational commitment [64]. In all these areas of organisational studies,
social inﬂuence can be regarded as the key socio-cognitive process that allows re-
searchers to predicate theories of ‘‘group mind’’-like constructs upon theories of in-
dividual cognition, social structure and social interaction. Clearly, a more analytical
understanding of the underpinning factors that determine how inﬂuence unfolds
over time would sharpen the debate centred around the attainability and evolution
of collective forms of mental models and cognitive architectures that cut across mul-
tiple agents within and among organisations.
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